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GOOD FAITH AND NARROW TAILORING IN
FISHER V. UNIVERSITYOF TEXAS
Jennifer Mason McAward*
In Grutter v. Bollinger,' the Supreme Court held that all
racial classifications, including those used in the University of
Michigan Law School's admissions processes, are subject to strict
scrutiny.2 Accordingly, "such classifications are constitutional
only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling
governmental interests."3 The Grutter Court also held that
broad-based diversity, one aspect of which is racial diversity, is a
compelling interest that a university may seek.4 Thus, the Court
found that the law school's admissions program was narrowly
tailored to further that compelling interest.
In Fisher v. University of Texas, a case currently pending at
the Supreme Court, the petitioner is challenging the admissions
system utilized by the University of Texas since 1997.6 She is not
asking the Court to overrule Grutter,' and she agrees that strict
scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review.8  Nor does she
contest-at least in the abstract-that broad-based diversity is a
compelling interest that the university may pursue.' This essay,
therefore, assumes that the Fisher Court will continue to deem
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame Law School; J.D., New
York University School of Law, 1998; B.A., University of Notre Dame, 1994.
1. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
2. Id. at 326-27.
3. Id. at 326.
4. Id. at 325.
5. Id. at 333-41.
6. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, No. 11-345 (S. Ct. argued
Oct. 10, 2012).
7. Id. at 56; Oral Argument at 8:17-19, Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, No. 11-345 (S.
Ct. argued Oct. 10, 2012), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/11-345.pdf.
8. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 24.
9. Instead, Fisher argues that the University of Texas is pursuing other
objectives that the Court has not approved. See id. at 19.
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broad-based diversity, one element of which is racial diversity, a
compelling interest. It focuses instead on how the Fisher Court
might conduct the narrow tailoring analysis given the operation
and effect of the University of Texas's admissions program.
Let me begin with a brief reminder of how the various
justices in Grutter approached narrow tailoring. The Grutter
majority, written by Justice O'Connor, said that for a program to
be narrowly tailored, it "must be specifically and narrowly framed
to accomplish [the state's compelling] purpose." 0 The Court
identified three principal factors in its narrow tailoring inquiry:
First, whether the admissions plan engaged in "highly
individualized, holistic review" or instead pursued a racial
quota." Second, whether the law school had demonstrated
"serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral
alternatives."12  And, third, whether the admissions program
"unduly harm[ed] members of any racial group."
Two of the dissents in Grutter-those of then-Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy-criticized the Court's narrow
tailoring analysis on two main factual grounds. First, they
argued that the "good faith consideration" standard was
inconsistent with strict scrutiny. 4 While courts might properly
defer to a university's definition of its educational objective,
courts should not defer to the methods by which the university
seeks to implement its goal." Second, they argued that, in
10. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003).
11. Id. at 334-38.
12. Id. at 339.
13. Id. at 341.
14. As Chief Justice Rehnquist stated:
Before the Court's decision today, we consistently applied the same strict
scrutiny analysis regardless of the government's purported reason for using race
and regardless of the setting in which race was being used. We rejected calls to
use more lenient review in the face of claims that race was being used in good
faith because [m]ore than good motives should be required when government
seeks to allocate its resources by way of an explicit racial classification system.
We likewise rejected calls to apply more lenient review based on the particular
setting in which race is being used. Indeed, even in the specific context of higher
education, we emphasized that constitutional limitations protecting individual
rights may not be disregarded.
Id. at 379-80 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
15. Id. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting):
(The Court confuses deference to a university's definition of its educational
objective with deference to the implementation of this goal. In the context of
university admissions the objective of racial diversity can be accepted based on
empirical data known to us, but deference is not to be given with respect to the
methods by which it is pursued.).
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operation, Michigan's program had mutated into a quota system
in which race was, in fact, outcome determinative.'
Despite his criticism of Michigan's admissions program,
Justice Kennedy expressed confidence that some diversity-
focused admissions programs could in fact survive strict
scrutiny. 7 Indeed, he provided a helpful guide for creating a
system that would survive strict scrutiny, at least in his view. He
said that such a system must safeguard individual assessment
through the entire process and use race as one modest factor
among many others.'" A constitutional system would not produce
statistical correlations that suggest fixed quotas, and admissions
officers would not track the racial composition of the incoming
class on a regular basis.' 9
Now, ten years later, we have Fisher-a case that in many
ways puts Justice Kennedy's optimism to the test. The
University of Texas, by at least most accounts, has operated in
good faith and has created essentially the system Justice
Kennedy described in his Grutter dissent." Yet, it is under heavy
fire.
Three general questions arise: First, when performing a
narrow tailoring inquiry, should the Court give any deference to
the university with respect to the university's choice of means by
which it seeks to diversify its class? Second, how should the
relatively modest impact of the university's racial preference
impact the Court's assessment of narrow tailoring? Third, what
is the constitutional relevance of Texas's Top Ten Percent
Program? That program, under which the university admits the
top ten percent of each Texas public high school's graduating
class, has substantially increased the population of
16. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 386 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting):
([The Law School has managed its admissions program, not to achieve a
"critical mass," but to extend offers of admission to members of selected minority
groups in proportion to their statistical representation in the applicant pool. But
this is precisely the type of racial balancing that the Court itself calls "patently
unconstitutional.'.
See id. at 390 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Law School's pursuit of critical mass
mutated into the equivalent of a quota.").
17. See id. at 392-93.
18. See id. (describing a system "where individual assessment is safeguarded
through the entire process" and where "race does not become a predominant factor").
19. See id. at 391.
20. See Brief for Respondents at 7, Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, No. 11-345 (S. Ct.
argued Oct. 10, 2012). See also infra text accompanying notes 37-39.
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underrepresented minorities at the university.21  Does the
relative success of the program make it a workable race-neutral
alternative that constitutionally precludes the school from adding
additional race-conscious diversity-seeking measures?
HOW DOES DEFERENCE RELATE TO NARROW
TAILORING
The first, and most fundamental, question is whether it is
possible to reconcile Grutter's use of deference with strict scrutiny
generally, and narrow tailoring, specifically. After Grutter, the
concern was that lower courts would take the majority's search
for "good faith consideration of workable race-neutral
alternatives" as license to apply a more lenient standard of
review to diversity-focused admissions programs.22 The Fifth
Circuit's opinion in Fisher gives credence to those concerns: 2 3 The
Fifth Circuit stated that it would give a "degree of deference" to
"the university's good faith determination that certain race-
conscious measures are necessary."2 4 Moreover, the court stated
that it would "scrutinize the University's decisionmaking process"
rather than the "merits of [its] decision," "to ensure that [the
university's] decision to adopt a race-conscious admissions policy
followed from the good faith consideration Grutter requires.""
And the court accorded the university a rebuttable presumption
that it had indeed operated in good faith.26
As one might expect under a traditional narrow tailoring
inquiry, the Fifth Circuit did in fact examine the operational
details of the University's admissions process, and consider the
21. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 5, 10 (noting that the percentage of
enrolled underrepresented minorities rose from 16.2% in 1998 to 21.4% in 2004).
22. See generally Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701, 757-58 (2007) (reasserting in response to the dissent and concurrences from
Court of Appeals decisions that "strict scrutiny applies to every racial classification"
(emphasis in original)); Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered
Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945, 970-71 (2004) (discussing the Court's distortion
and weakening of the strict scrutiny standard); Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Grutter and
Gratz: A Critical Analysis, 41 HOuS. L. REV. 459, 511 (2004) (expressing confusion
regarding the Court's dilution of the strict scrutiny standard).
23. See Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 249-51 (5th Cir. 2011),
cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012) (Garza, J., specially concurring) (criticizing the
Grutter majority for failing to apply true strict scrutiny).
24. Id. at 233 (majority opinion).
25. Id. at 231 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 231-32.
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merits of the argument that Texas's Top Ten Percent law
presented a workable race-neutral alternative.2 7 However, the
manner in which it described its task-a deferential, process-
oriented review that inverts strict scrutiny's traditional burden of
proof-is highly unlikely to find defenders at the Court. The
Court has consistently invoked strict scrutiny in evaluating racial
classifications, 28 and has made clear that, under strict scrutiny,
"the government has the burden of proving that racial
classifications 'are narrowly tailored measures that further
compelling governmental interests."'29 While Grutter did
presume the good faith of a university in defining its institutional
mission for purposes of finding a compelling state interest,3 0 the
Court has never indicated that the narrow tailoring inquiry
should utilize deference or focus on anything other than the
operational details of the race-based classification at issue.
Indeed, the university does not really defend the Fifth Circuit's
articulation in its briefing.3 1 And, while the Fifth Circuit's
formulation did not receive specific attention at the oral
argument, several justices made it clear that they anticipated
active judicial supervision of both the ends and means of
affirmative action programs. 32 Thus, even if the Court maintains
that universities are entitled to deference with respect to their
diversity objectives,3 3 I anticipate that the Court will take this
opportunity to clarify that the university bears the entire burden
of justifying a race-based classification, and that the Court will
actively and skeptically review not just the university's good
faith, but also the operational details of the affirmative action
program as well as the efficacy of alternative race-neutral
27. See Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 226-30 (5th Cir. 2011),
cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012) (examining the holistic operation of admissions);
id. at 234-35 (rejecting the claim that the university is utilizing a racial quota). See
also id. at 238-42 (analyzing the effect of the Top Ten Percent law).
28. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (quoting Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)) (stating that "all racial
classifications [imposed by government] ... must be analyzed by a reviewing court
under strict scrutiny").
29. Id. at 505.
30. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003).
31. Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 47-50.
32. See, e.g., Oral Argument, supra note 7, at 44:10 (questioning by Chief Justice
Roberts regarding how to quantify the "critical mass").
33. See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461 (2005)
(arguing that universities are First Amendment institutions that deserve deference
with respect to their institutional goals).
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approaches.
NARROW TAILORING AND THE LIMITED EFFECT OF
TEXAS'S RACIAL PREFERENCE
The next question is how the Court will perform the narrow
tailoring inquiry with respect to the merits of this case. Texas
appears to have fashioned a system that tracks, and even
improves upon, the Michigan plan approved in Grutter,34 the
Harvard plan cited favorably by Justice Powell in Bakke,3 5 and
even the hypothetical system described by Justice Kennedy in his
Grutter dissent.36 Texas's plan does not work toward a numeric
target. It gives individualized consideration to each applicant.
Race is not a predominant factor, but rather-as the university
puts it-is a "factor of a factor of a factor of a factor" in the
admissions process. 8 And the racial composition of the class is
not monitored during the admissions process.39 Thus, insofar as
the narrow tailoring inquiry focuses on the operational details of
the university's plan, the plan is narrowly tailored in a manner
that the Court has previously described. Thus, the Court should
not take issue with these aspects of the university's admissions
scheme.
Given that the operation of the system tracks what the Court
has approved in the past, the narrow tailoring inquiry focuses on
two other issues: First, is the program too narrowly tailored? In
other words, is its use of race so limited in scope and efficacy that
it is constitutionally superfluous? Second, is the program
necessary to achieve diversity, or is Texas's Top Ten Percent law
a race-neutral alternative that adequately advances the
university's interest in diversity?
34. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334-38 (2003) (approving plan that does
not operate as a quota, but instead uses race as a "'plus' factor in the context of
individualized consideration of each and every applicant").
35. Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316-18 (1978) (opinion
of Powell, J.) (endorsing plan in which "race or ethnic background may be deemed a
'plus' in a particular applicant's file, [and yet] does not insulate the individual from
comparison with all other candidates for the available seats").
36. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 390-93 (critiquing program where the statistics "raise[d]
an inference that the Law School subverted individual determination" and instead
pursued a quota, and where "admissions officers consulted the daily reports which
indicated the composition of the incoming class along racial lines").
37. Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 1-2.
38. Id. at 13.
39. Id. at 2.
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For the six-year period in which the Top Ten Percent law
was in operation with no additional race-conscious measures
(1998-2004), the percentage of underrepresented minorities40
enrolled in the incoming freshman class rose from 16.2% to
21.4%.41 For the three years during which racial preferences
were added into the system (2005-200842), the percentage of these
enrolled minorities rose to 25.5%-a 4.1% increase.4 3 In 2008,
when Abigail Fisher applied, "full file review,"-i.e., the race-
conscious portion of the admissions program-resulted in a
sizable number of minority admits (35% of total underrepresented
minorities admitted)." However, the yield for the enrolled class
was far smaller, with 3.4% of the entire in-state enrolled class
(216 of 6322) constituting underrepresented minorities admitted
through full-file review. Moreover, it is likely that many of
those 216 would have been admitted even without consideration
of race. While the parties dispute the numbers of enrolled
students for whom race would have been dispositive,46 Fisher
calculates that race was dispositive for only 33 enrolled students,
or .5% of the class.
Fisher argues that a racial classification that produces such
a small yield of enrolled students cannot be viewed as making a
"constitutionally meaningful impact on student body diversity."4 8
She cites Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1,49 which stated that "the minimal impact"
the racial classification used in that case had on school
enrollment "casts doubt on the necessity of using racial
40. As used in Fisher, this term includes African Americans and Hispanics. See
Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 224 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted,
132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012)
41. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 10 (noting the percentage of
underrepresented minorities in 1998); id. at 5 (noting the percentage of
underrepresented minorities in 2004).
42. Abigail Fisher applied to the University of Texas in 2008. See Fisher, 631
F.3d at 217.
43. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 10.
44. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 38.
45. See id. at 9.
46. Compare Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 38-39, with Brief for
Respondents, supra note 20, at 14.
47. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 11.
48. Id. at 39.
49. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007).
Loyola Law Review
classifications."5 o It is not clear, though, that this concern applies
equally here. In this case, it is difficult to assess the real impact
of the racial classification because the statistics regarding the
effect of the university's program are malleable and in dispute.
While Fisher asserts that race was dispositive for 33 enrolled
students, 1 the university claims that the focus should be on
admitted students, and that full-file review accounted for 20% of
all African-American admits and 15% of all Hispanic admits.52
Moreover, the factual context in which the Court articulated
its concern in Parents Involved was quite different than the facts
in Fisher. In Parents Involved, the school districts used a binary
definition of race (i.e., white/non-white) as a determining factor
for school assignments-an "extreme approach" that concerned
the Court.53  Here, the university uses race in a more nuanced
way in its admissions formula and, indeed, in a manner that the
Court itself has approved in the past. The Court has repeatedly
stated that the hallmark of a constitutional university affirmative
action admissions program is one in which race plays only a
modest and nuanced role. 54  Thus, even if Fisher's calculations
are correct, to deem the university's admissions program too
narrowly tailored would essentially be to condemn it for following
the Court's prior guidance. At oral argument, Justice Kennedy
was very skeptical, understandably so, about this line of
argument.5 5
IS TEXAS'S TOP TEN PERCENT LAW AN EFFECTIVE
RACE-NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVE?
Thus, the narrow tailoring analysis in Fisher is likely to
focus on Fisher's argument that the university has alternative,
effective race-neutral means available to it in its quest for racial
diversity. Fisher points to two alternatives, both of which focus
50. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 734
(2007).
51. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 10.
52. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 38.
53. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 704, 735.
54. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337, 339 (2003) (finding that Michigan
Law School's program was "individualized," "holistic," and "nuanced"). See also
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 790 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (advocating "nuanced, individual evaluation of ... student
characteristics").
55. See Oral Argument, supra note 7.
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on Texas's Top Ten Percent law.5 ' First, she points out that
almost half the minorities currently admitted to the university
through the Top Ten Percent program do not enroll at the
university." Thus, she suggests that better recruiting of those
admitted minority students would yield a meaningful increase in
minority enrollment even without resort to race-conscious
measures.5 8 While this is an appealing argument in the abstract,
and one that points to the sort of race-conscious measures Justice
Kennedy has cited approvingly in the past,5 9 it is not clear that
such an effort will be effective at the University of Texas. In its
Fisher brief, the university noted that it has gone "deep into the
playbook for race-neutral alternatives" relating to recruiting and
scholarships, but "levels of underrepresented minorities at UT
remained stagnant, at best," in the absence of race-conscious
admissions policies. 0
Second, Fisher's most serious and fundamental challenge on
the narrow tailoring prong is that the Top Ten Percent law itself
is a sufficient alternative to a race-conscious admissions program.
She argues that the 4.1% increase in minority enrollment
obtained through "full file review" is not a sufficiently meaningful
benefit to justify the costs imposed by the consideration of race.
In other words, Fisher is arguing-at least on the facts here-
that the 21.4% minority enrollment achieved through the Top
Ten Percent program is constitutionally sufficient to preclude
future race-conscious action by the university.61
This argument could find some purchase at the Court. While
the university points to Grutter and claims that it seeks an
unspecified "critical mass" of underrepresented minorities in its
enrolled class,6 2 some members of the Court were very concerned
about the indeterminacy of the university's diversity target.
Chief Justice Roberts, for example, stated that he could not
assess whether the university's admissions program was
narrowly tailored until the university quantified its diversity
56. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 4 (describing Top Ten Percent Law).
57. See id. at 42 n.10.
58. See id.
59. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 789
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
60. Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 35.
61. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 35.
62. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 40-41; see also Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308 (2003).
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goal." Fisher's claim that 21.4% minority enrollment is
sufficient-at least at the University of Texas-might give
interested members of the Court a vehicle to clarify and quantify
acceptable racial diversity goals.
This argument is problematic on a number of fronts. First,
any desire to concretize the concept of critical mass is in tension
with the Court's previous insistence that universities may not
pursue numerical quotas or targets.64 Moreover, in Grutter, the
majority specifically rejected the argument that percentage plans
are a constitutionally required race-neutral alternative to
affirmative action programs. Such programs, Grutter stated,
"preclude the university from conducting the individualized
assessments necessary to assemble a student body that is ...
diverse along all the qualities valued by the university."65
Further, it is not clear that the Court could ever endorse a set
numerical target that would be automatically transferrable to
other public universities. A 21.4% constitutional maximum in
Texas may well not be the right target for other state schools that
are confronting different histories, admissions trends, and state
demographics.
If the Court were to embrace Fisher's argument on this
point, it would have somewhat counterintuitive consequences.
Texas's Top Ten Percent law has been relatively successful in
creating racial diversity because Texas's public high schools are
severely segregated by race.6 In a state where public high
schools have higher levels of racial integration, one can imagine a
Top Ten Percent law yielding fewer minority admits, particularly
if there is a race-based achievement gap among high school
students." If the Court were to adopt Fisher's proposal, in states
where Top Ten Percent plans would not yield adequate racial
diversity, race-conscious diversity programs would remain
constitutionally permissible. This would result in the peculiar
situation where states with greater secondary school integration
would have a broad array of constitutional tools available to
63. Oral Argument, supra note 7, at 37:54.
64. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 309 (2003).
65. Id. at 340.
66. Brief for Respondents, supra note 20, at 8.
67. See, e.g., Provisional Data File: SY2010-11 Four-Year Regulatory Adjusted
Cohort Graduation Rates, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., available at
http://www2.ed.gov/documents/press-releases/state-2010-11-graduation-rate-data.pdf
(providing state-by-state high school graduation rates, broken down by race).
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pursue university-level integration while states with greater
segregation will have correspondingly fewer options and, indeed,
will be constitutionally barred from pursuing integration through
race-conscious action.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, I anticipate that the Court will use Fisher to
clarify the level of scrutiny it will apply to university admissions
programs. I also expect that it will provide additional guidance
on how the narrow tailoring inquiry should proceed in cases
dealing with university admissions programs. Whereas the
Grutter Court focused its narrow tailoring inquiry primarily on
the operational details of the plan, 8 the Fisher Court may focus
on the availability of a race-neutral approach-namely, Texas's
Top Ten Percent law. How the Fisher Court deals with that issue
will surely have major implications for state universities and
state legislatures in years to come.
68. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333-39 (2003).
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